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Abstract 
This study investigates the characteristics of corporate governance in Greece today as illustrated through a thorough analysis of 
the Corporate Governance Statements of all public companies in the Athens Stock Exchange. We attempt to highlight various 
characteristics of the enforcement of corporate governance rules in the everyday practice of corporations. We identify 
idiosyncratic factors pertaining in the Greek market that present interesting features in the global context. On average firms 
comply with internationally accepted Corporate Governance Codes, as they have been adopted in Greece by the Hellenic 
Federation of Enterprises (SEV), even though the number of firms that gradually develop their own Corporate Governance Codes 
is increasing. Greek firms appear to have surprisingly low percentages of CEO – Chairman of Board duality phenomena. On the 
other hand, in relation with other corporate governance best practices, we find the relative absence of committees other than the 
Audit Committee, which is compulsory, while the majority of firms are directed by small Boards of fewer than eight members. 
On the negative side we also document low presence of women in Boards and a high percentage of main stock holder family 
members on companies’ Boards. When examining the distribution between executive and non-executive members in Boards it is 
found that the majority of Boards consist of executive and non-executive members, whereas independent non-executive members 
are constrained within the limits set by Greek corporate governance legislation. Our analysis further highlights that even though 
corporate governance implementation has been introduced to the local market for only approximately ten years, firms and 
authorities tend to be relatively strict relative to the level of conformity with internationally accepted corporate governance 
legislation.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate Governance is a network of principles and practices based on which a company is organized and 
governed so that the long-term needs of shareholders and stakeholders will be preserved in the best possible manner.  
It evolved gradually over the past decades gaining publicity and widespread recognition as an area of research 
worthy of attention, especially towards the end of the 90s with accounting and financial scandals affecting the global 
marketplace. In Greece it was first introduced in the Greek Capital Market in the same period as a necessary move 
from the regulatory authorities towards the goal of controlling the unprecedented growth of stock prices and public 
interest experienced then. The first attempt of Greek authorities to set some common rules for all listed firms was the 
enforcement of quality criteria in the firms’ practices towards their relationship with the shareholders. The Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission, in attempting to promote best practices in corporate governance, adopted, during the 
same period, rules and practices suggested by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which 
inspired in turn the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) to organize the first general suggested practices in 
corporate governance for Greek firms. L.3016/2002, that attempted to set the basic regulatory framework, still 
remains the main regulatory tool characterizing the Greek Corporate Governance experience. L.3340/2005, 
L.3371/2005, L.3556/2007, L.3693/2008, L.3884/2010 and, more importantly for the purpose of the present paper, 
L.3873/2010, that integrated in the Greek Law EU Directive 2006/46/EC, present the main components of the 
legislation currently holding. The Athens Stock Exchange and the Hellenic Capital Market Commission have further 
facilitated this process by introducing Rulebooks, Decisions and Directives that constitute a very detailed and strict 
legal framework for public firms. The implementation of similar laws and practices worldwide is commonplace 
today and authorities and policymakers attempt to strengthen and update the relevant framework so as to cater for 
the needs of the ever changing capital market environment. 
Public companies are obliged to conform to the regulatory framework pertaining in each market, which is both 
desirable for the common implementation of best business practices, while it is also rewarded by potential and 
existing shareholder in the context of a very competitive environment as far as available investments in the capital 
market are concerned. Especially before the gradual tightening of the law framework that set an equal opportunities 
and obligations market structure, the market was prepared to pay a significant premium to firms enforcing strict 
corporate governance rules in their operations. This finding still holds but to a lesser extent.  
In 2010, after the introduction of L.3873/2010, SEV took the initiative to codify the existing legislation and put 
together best practices suggested worldwide, providing a policy role model for local listed firms, under the name of 
“SEV Corporate Governance Code”. L.3873/2010 requires that all public firms in Greece should incorporate in the 
General Assembly Statement of the Annual Report a discrete section containing information on the followed 
corporate governance practices and the Code of Corporate Governance that describes them, accompanied with 
possible deviations and further explanations and information. In 2012 the Hellenic Exchanges in a joint initiative 
with SEV formed the Hellenic Corporate Governance Council, which aims at promoting the endorsement of a Greek 
Corporate Governance Code by Greek firms, while warranting the continuous relevance and implementation of this 
Code. 
Continuous research worldwide attempts to highlight whether various aspects of corporate governance affect 
performance, corporate profitability, while also scrutinizing particular traits in the context of various markets. Our 
attempt is to provide a brief approximation of the current situation in the Greek market after the introduction of the 
Corporate Governance Statement obligation for public firms. In an effort to pinpoint idiosyncratic characteristics in 
the Greek market, a small developed market of Southern Europe, we conclude that Greece presents a hybrid model 
standing in between Anglo-Saxon and European model practices, an affirmation made also in Gutierrez and Surroca 
(2013) when examining the Spanish market. Some best practices in corporate governance, like the existence of Audit 
Committees, are enforced, after they were made compulsory though, given the gradually stricter legislation. Others, 
such as the duality issue, are interestingly adopted by Greek firms to a greater extent than normally expected, given 
the traditional nature of the average Greek firm still being family controlled. The latter characteristic is evident from 
the increased presence of more than one family member on corporate boards. Even though Greek legislation was late 
in adopting some of the suggested best practices worldwide and while still after the introduction of the Corporate 
Governance Codes there is ample space for firms not to be as strict on corporate governance mechanisms, if they 
wish, we consider that on average the level of conformity of Greek firms with internationally accepted standards is 
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very satisfactory. The gradual evolvement of the new Greek Corporate Governance Code and a possible adoption by 
the majority of companies or its partial integration in the legislation will further facilitate its implementation process.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
Corporate Governance is largely based on agency theory implications. It is concerned primarily with the 
separation of duties between principals – stockholders and agents – managers. Agency theory claims that agents 
might be tempted to follow action and take decisions that are not to the principals’ interests. These actions could take 
the form of maintaining costly remuneration packages to their own benefit, avoiding mergers and acquisitions in the 
fear of losing their own privileges or on the contrary encouraging merger and acquisition plans that could only serve 
the agents’ benefits through large bonuses and stock options and not the long-term interests of shareholders. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) outlined the possible mechanisms through which the interests of principals can be enforced. In 
this way, the role of managerial incentive plans was analysed, like stock options, as possible mechanisms of aligning 
the interests of principals and agents. Coupled with other mechanisms, such as other incentive oriented plans, they 
collectively have the role of limiting the agency problem. Other corporate governance mechanisms suggested are the 
inclusion of outsiders in Board of Directors by introducing the idea of independent non – executive members in 
Boards. Alternatively it is suggested that minority stockholders should be represented. Non – executive member 
presence is necessary, amounting to particular levels, given local laws applying in each capital market. The 
introduction of specialized committees operating within the context of Board of Directors, are alternative measures 
underlying the need for control of corporate decision making. These mechanisms combined, are believed to limit the 
agency problem magnitude, even though policy makers accept the inability of these mechanisms to completely 
abolish it.  
The use of incentive programmes for agents is based on the rationale that if managers are happy with the level of 
compensation they will align their decisions with the best interests of the principals they represent. Incentive 
contracts could be found in the form of stock options deriving their value from accounting set targets or measures of 
performance relative to the overall market (Fama, 1980). The optimal contract derives its value from the risk 
aversion of the manager and the degree to which his decisions affect the well-being of the firm and consequently 
shareholders (Holmstrom, 1999). Academic research reveals a positive influence between executive remuneration 
and firm performance, while managers tend to wish to sign new remuneration packages when positive results are 
imminent (Core et al., 1999). Incentive plans have been blamed for excessive risk-taking on the part of fund 
managers, thus deviating from their intended role (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Furthermore, academic research does 
not always agree on the positive relationship between executive compensation and financial results (Conyon et al., 
1995). 
Apart from executive compensation a further mechanism used to mitigate the agency problem is strengthening the 
role of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors represents the second in importance company tool embodying 
governing power. The more independent the Board the greater its monitoring power. Apart from the degree of their 
independence, Boards should primarily consist of non-executive members. This in part will ensure even greater 
autonomy and compliance with decisions that are not harmful to main shareholders (Jensen, 1993). Boards of 
Directors should also meet with such frequency that will ensure maximum possible monitoring and control 
(Shivadasani και Zenner, 2004). Vafeas (1999) advocates that Boards should judge the required frequency of 
meetings by balancing between costs and benefits arising from them. A further attribute of Board effectiveness is its 
leadership structure, that cannot be guaranteed by simply increasing the number of non – executive members. Some 
degree of executive members’ participation is necessary and a strong nomination committee can ensure that only the 
most competent and committed individuals will form part of it. 
Another major deterrent against extensive power gathered by a single person is the separation of roles between 
the Chairman of the company’s Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer. In the business world, before 
the introduction of corporate governance ideal practices, this duality phenomenon was considered commonplace. 
What is more, firms in Europe, where family-run firms were and still are a large proportion of public firms, one can 
find companies where the same person is also the main shareholder. The concentration of all this power is 
considered undesirable for the welfare of small shareholders and the actual long term interests of the firm itself 
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(Jensen, 1993). If this problem is surpassed, the Board of Directors has an increasingly important role of controlling 
the managers’ decisions, aligning them with the targets set by the General Assembly, with an ensuing benefit of 
financial performance (Pi and Timme, 1993). It could be advocated however that not allowing firms to reward their 
well performing CEOs with the Chairman’s position is an impediment to the policies that the remuneration 
committee could follow. When considering though the tremendous power concentrated in one person when the 
separation of these two roles does not hold, and the risks incurred from the need to replace the person holding these 
positions in the case of bad performance, it becomes clear that firms should consider it very seriously before 
allowing with this situation to prolong. 
When examining the structure of Boards it is claimed that the degree of non – executive members in a company’s 
Board guarantees more efficient monitoring of the management team’s actions (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), while 
this Board is also more likely to proceed with changes in the management team if needs be (Weisbach, 1988). 
Boards controlled by non – executive members are also more likely to be objective on their decisions regarding the 
best choice for a management position amongst candidates (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Huson, 2001). This is part of 
the responsibilities of the Remuneration and Human Resources Committee that will keep a short list of possible for 
every major management as well as Board of Directors position. Another advantage of holding a Board consisting of 
few insiders is the positive market reaction, as the general notion is that this will deter negative performance on the 
part of managers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). 
A further tool used to mitigate the agency problem is the establishment of specialized Board Committees that are 
considered to be able to confront important issues more efficiently. John and Senbet (1998) document that the 
existence of Committees such as the Audit, Remuneration and Nomination ones, are positively related with variables 
enabling efficient control. They claim that when executive board members form part of these committees, they are 
more likely to produce poor audit work. Moreover, when the CEO holds an important role in their formation, it is 
probable that few outsiders will be chosen for these positions, and even if not, they will have controversial vested 
interests on the firm. Sound corporate governance practices call for the need that these committees are formed 
almost exclusively with non – executive members, ideally independent. Firms according to Greek corporate 
governance laws are obliged to disclose information on the formation and function of these committees. The 
existence of the Audit Committee has been rendered necessary with L.3016/2002, while the SEV Code for corporate 
Governance strongly recommends the establishment of at least a Remuneration and Nomination Committee. Their 
existence has empirically proven to benefit the decision making process (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), while 
committees controlled by insiders can be significantly harmful for minority shareholding (Vafeas, 1999).  
The size of these committees is a further aspect that academic literature has investigated, since small committees 
are not influenced by insiders’ wishes (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). On the contrary, larger committees are more 
prone to manipulation. Klein (2002) claims that maximum independence of these committees is highly desirable for 
efficient management practices to be promoted in the everyday running of the institution. Greek laws require Audit 
Committee members to combine specialized knowledge on audit functions, in line with the generally accepted 
notion (Bedard, 2004). It is also claimed that the frequency of the committee’s meetings directly affects the quality 
of control and facilitates proactive action on possible wrongdoings.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
Based upon the official Annual Reports of companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange we gathered specific 
information mainly incorporated in the section of the Annual Report dedicated to the Corporate Governance 
practices implemented in each company (Corporate Governance Statements). As part of this Statement, L.3873/2010 
rendered the release of this information compulsory, starting from March 2011, when the 2010 annual financial 
results were released. Our data-set comprises of a detailed analysis of 226 annual reports issued in March 2012 and 
partly to the analysis of 234 Annual Reports issued in March 2011. Therefore the emphasis is on the derived results 
for the financial year 2011, but some comparative information for 2010 are also offered. 
The derived results were evaluated as of equal importance whether the firm declares that it complies with the 
SEV Code or it has developed its own Corporate Governance Code. Further information was utilised after analyzing 
the Annual Reports of the sample companies. When data on the topics analysed could not be located either in the 
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Corporate Governance Declaration or the firms Annual Report, results reported in the empirical section refer to the 
sample of companies for which definite information is found. When comparative results for 2010 are offered, this is
clearly stated. A more concrete report should also contain information for the 2012 Annual Reports released end of 
March 2013. This would enable a researcher to outline information for three consecutive years after the introduction
of L.3873/2010 that made this Corporate Governance Declaration obligatory.
4. Empirical results
This section of the paper summarizes our empirical findings, after analyzing the information derived from the
listed firms Annual Reports for 2010-2011 and other pertinent information offered on their web sites. Our findings 
indicate that the majority of firms have adopted the SEV Corporate Governance Code. We find that in the second
year of the enforcement of L.3873/2010, 61% declared that they followed the SEV Code, whereas in 2010, the first 
year of enforcement of the Law, this figure was 64%. Based on companies’ own declarations it appears that the main
reason firms form their own Corporate Governance Code is their willingness to bypass the need to justify deviations
from the rules and issues raised by the SEV Code. In essence this 39% of companies feel that the SEV Code is far
too strict for their size and actual needs. However, when examining figures shown on Table 1, it can be found that on 
average larger proportion from the small and mid capitalization firms adopted the SEV Code relative to the large
capitalization firms. This could be attributed to the implications involved in forming a Code of Corporate
Governance of your own. The procedure is detailed, time-consuming, so that many smaller firms find it difficult to
confront. However, the tendency of smaller firms adopting own Codes of Corporate Governance is growing.
Table 1. Code of Corporate Governance for Athens Stock Exchange listed companies.
2011 2010
SEV Code of Corporate Governance 61% 64%
Own Code of Corporate Governance 39% 36%
Large Capitalization firms – SEV Code 36% 33%
Small and Mid Capitalization firms – SEV Code 65% 70%
With regard to the number of Board of Directors members, we have summarized the basic categories identified on
Figure 1. Boards of Directors in Greece for the majority of firms are complying with the minimum requirements of 
L.3016/2002. For this reason almost around half of the firms have Boards with five members or less. Larger firms
however do have larger Boards with the category 8-11 members representing one third of our sample.
Fig. 1. Size of Board of Directors. The figures show the number of Greek stock exchange listed firms per category as at 31.12.2011.
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Small Boards of Directors are more common in small and mid capitalization firms, as evident from the results 
shown in Table 2. This policy aims at reducing conflicts within the Board, as well as any possibility that it will be
cumbersome and slow in reacting to issues that need swift action. Boards with fewer members appear to have better 
performance than those with larger size. In some cases investors are also lured from concentrated power, hoping to
find decisive and fast moving Directorships in these companies. Large Boards, on the other hand, are heterogeneous
and not ideal for imminent action and fast strategic decisions.
Table 2 illustrates that the average Board of Directors averaged approximately eight members in 2011, while the
corresponding sizes for small-mid cap firms and large firms where 7.5 and 12 members correspondingly. It should 
be emphasized that the SEV Code advocates the need to have Boards of 7-15 members, being according to
international practices the ideal average size. There are cases of firms that have adopted the SEV Code, where this
suggested practice is not followed. If this applies, firms declaring the SEV Code as their chosen Code of Corporate
Governance, have to provide sound justification for this deviation from the suggested ideal corporate governance
practices. This finding, of the decreasing number of Board members, being dependent on the decreasing market
capitalization of firms is in line with Florou and Galarniotis (2006) that also observed this diminishing figure as a
function of the market capitalisation.
Table 2. Size of Board of Directors.
Average Lowest Highest
Overall sample 8 4 19
Large Capitalization firms 12 6 19
Small and Mid Capitalization firms 7.5 4 12
Boards consist mainly of non-executive members as shown in Table 3, which pinpoints that 52% of Board 
members are characterized as such. This comes in contrast to the common belief in the Greek market, where firms
are believed to cater for the minimum possible needs as far as corporate governance compliance is concerned. 72%
of firms have one to three non executive members, while the vast majority (4 out 5) have less than three independent 
non-executive members on the Board as it is required by L.3016/2002. Figure 2 also shows that more than half of the
firms have fewer than 3 executive members contrary to the common belief that Greek firms’ Boards are mainly
dominated by main stockholding family members. To a large extent the category of over seven members per 
category of Board members is dominated by large capitalization firms.
Fig. 2. Board of Directors composition in 2011. The figures denote number of firms having 1-3, 4-6 and more than 7 members per category of 
member accordingly.
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As regards L.3016/2002, as it applies after some minor amendments with L.3091/2002, Greek firms are required 
to have one third of their Board consisting of non-executive members of whom at least two should be independent 
non - executive ones. The latter does not apply when minority shareholders form part or all of these two places in the 
Board secured for independent non - executive members. Furthermore, independent non - executive members are 
required to have a maximum of 0.5% shareholding in the firm and naturally have no relation to the main 
stockholders and executive members in the form of being current or ex-employees, stakeholders or relatives of top 
management of main stockholders etc. Undisclosed data also show that the majority of firms apply the maximum 
length of life to their elected Boards, since L.2190/1920, as it applies today, quotes a maximum of 6 years. 
             Table 3. Number of non – executive and independent non – executive members in Boards in 2011 in percentage format. 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Percentage of non – executive members (% of total size) 52 26 78 
Percentage of independent non – executive members (% of 
total number of non – executive members) 
60 25 100 
 
With regard to other aspects relating to the Board of Directors composition and information pertinent to its 
operation can be found in Table 4. What can be deduced from these is that small capitalization firms enforce to a 
greater extent the Code of SEV’s special directive of the necessity to have ideally one third of independent non – 
executive members in the Board of Directors. This difference relative to large capitalization firms however is partly 
misleading since as noted in Table 2, larger firms have larger Boards, consequently a finding of this kind cannot 
allow us to make clear conclusions. It is interesting to note however that the corresponding percentages are smaller 
in 2011 relative to 2010. The latter also applies for small and mid cap firms when determining the number of 
companies that offer a clear indication of the number of Board of Directors meetings taking place every year. This is 
a further prerequisite arising from the SEV Code, that firms adopting their own Code of Corporate Governance 
avoid quantifying.  
                              Table 4. Other corporate governance aspects relating to Board of Directors in percentage format. 
 2011 2010 
Independent members at least 1/3 of Board – Large 
Capitalisation firms 
39% 43% 
Independent members at least 1/3 of Board – Small and Mid 
Capitalisation firms 
51% 56% 
Firms declaring number of Board of Directors meetings per 
year - Large Capitalisation firms 
58% 40% 
Firms declaring number of Board of Directors meetings per 
year - Small and Mid Capitalisation firms 
29% 41% 
 
When attempting to examine the basic Corporate Governance ideal practice of separating the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors position with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) we find the results shown in Table 5. These 
results show that on average Greek firms conform to the major suggested best corporate governance practice of 
separation of duties between Chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO. This tendency is gradually strengthening 
evidence that Corporate Governance develops robust foundations inside the average Greek firm. The common belief 
is that Greek firms, being largely family owned, in the context of the continental corporate governance model, would 
have had larger percentage of the main shareholder, being at the same time Chairman and CEO.  
                              Table 5. Other corporate governance aspects linking the Board of Directors and company executives in percentage format. 
 2011 2010 
Same person as Chairman of Board and CEO 38% 45% 
Different person as Chairman of Board and CEO 62% 55% 
Executive Vice Chairman when Chairman and CEO same 
person 
62% 56% 
Non-executive Vice Chairman when Chairman and CEO 
same person 
25% 22% 
CFO participation on Board 21% 24% 
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However in the case of firms that do not follow the duality rationale the percentage of firms having a non - 
executive Vice President is smaller and receding. This is interesting since normally one would expect that firms with 
a duality issue to at least have a non – executive Vice president on the Board. At the same time it is found that 
CFO’s have a small participation in Boards, with a mere 21% found in 2011. 
When examining two further interesting aspects of corporate governance structure in Greece, that of the degree of 
family members and women participating in Boards of Directors, we found the data depicted in Table 6. Based on 
L.3340/2005 Greek firms are obliged to declare any family ties interconnecting members of the Board, thereafter 
certain obligations arising regarding stock transactions for market transparency reasons. The degree to which family 
members are found on Board of Directors is marginally larger than half of the sample. This finding could be partially 
biased since in collecting the data we attempted to ascertain this fact judging by Board members surnames, thus 
some misspecifications being inevitable. Nonetheless, we believe the main finding holds. Firms occasionally place 
relatives even in independent non – executive member positions breaching the rationale of the Law against family 
controlled Board of Directors. 
                              Table 6. Main shareholder family members and women in Board of Directors for 2011 in percentage format. 
 YES NO 
Family members on Board 52% 48% 
Women on Board 45% 55% 
 
With regard to women’s participation in listed companies Boards, findings after examining the 2011 Annual 
Reports show that over half of the firms do not include women in their Boards. Women in fact on average constitute 
less that 10% of total Board members, which is in sharp contrast with the number of women working for firms. At 
the same time though only 13% of women on a paneuropean level hold top management positions. European 
Commission officials are gradually moving from a voluntary increase in the number of women on Boards towards a 
compulsory quota.  
We further examined the types of Committees operating in listed firms. Different types of specialized Board 
Committees exist. Figure 3 shows the main committees operating in Greek firms. It is compulsory for Greek firms to 
have formed an Audit Committee consisting of Board of Directors non – executive members. In Figure 3 we show 
only results as derived from companies’ Annual Reports. Apart from the Audit Committee, around 15-20% of firms 
also have Human Resources and Remuneration Committees. In some case these committees operate under the same 
umbrella. Various other committees operate in some firms ranging from Risk Management, to Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility matters.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Main Board Committees operating in Greek firms in 2011. 
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The existence of a Remuneration and Human Resources committee is advisable by Corporate Governance ideal 
practices directives as also incorporated in the SEV Code. The operation of this committee is generally believed to 
reduce the degree of conflicts of interest within Boards, increase the level of employee satisfaction through well 
structured remuneration packages, while also accommodate the executive management positions and Board 
members substitution process.  The existence of Corporate Governance committees ensures compliance with 
Corporate Governance laws and ideal practices, while risk management committees are usually found in the case of 
financial institutions facing diverse risks in their operations. Boards of Directors members, comprising the majority 
of these specialized committees, are non – executive members. 
When examining the role of the remuneration committee and the policy of the company in exposing information 
on the fees structure for executives and Board members we find the information summarized in Table 7. Firms on 
average do not include an explicit analysis of their remuneration policies towards top management executives and 
Board of Directors members. They seem to be reluctant to release such information in the absence of a compulsory 
clause in the current legislation. This is strongly advisable however by the SEV Code and gradually an increasing 
number of firms include this information in the Corporate Governance statements as they appear in the Annual 
Report. The percentage of firms dedicating a relevant separate section on their Annual Report more than doubled 
(from 5% in 2010 to 13% in 2011). All firms offer the minimum of information which is confined to a collective 
amount for the total remuneration of all executives and Board members quoted in the short version of the financial 
statements, usually called Financial Statements and Information Report. At the same time we note that large 
capitalization firms are tremendously more conscious of the necessity to place emphasis on remuneration policies, 
since 73% operate Remuneration Committees relative to only 16% for small and mid capitalization firms.  
                        Table 7. Degree of transparency regarding remuneration of executives and Board of Directors members in 2011. 
 YES NO 
Large Capitalisation firms operating Remuneration 
Committees 
73% 27% 
Small and Mid Capitalisation firms operating Remuneration 
Committees 
16% 84% 
Firms explicitly announcing the degree of executive 
compensation  
13% 87% 
 
 
The last part of this empirical part examined aspects of the internal audit function. It is found, as shown in Table 
8, that firms are reluctant to disclose detailed information on either the exact internal audit practices followed or the 
particular interrelations underpinning the Audit Committee – Internal Audit department collaboration that ensures 
high degree of internal audit procedures commensurate to internationally accepted standards. Furthermore, it is not 
clear after examining company Annual Reports how often on average Audit Committees operate, even though it is 
explicitly mentioned in L.3016/2202 that they should meet with the Internal Audit department head at least once 
every three months, during the period coinciding with the 3-month interim financial results release. Audit 
Committees consist of non - executive members with independent members presiding.  
                        Table 8. Degree of disclosure of information concerning Internal Audit practices. 
 YES NO 
Detailed disclosure of Internal Audit practices 13% 87% 
Detailed description of the Audit Committee practices 24% 76% 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper provides a brief approach of the current status of corporate governance in Greek public firms after the 
introduction of L.3873/2010, which obliges firms to follow a particular Corporate Governance Code. The Hellenic 
Federation of Enterprises (SEV) is the first body that codified the existing corporate governance legislation, 
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integrated elements of the suggested corporate governance best practices worldwide and created this listed firms 
“Rulebook” on corporate governance. Our survey spans the first two years of firms’ obligation to release information 
on their corporate governance practices through the Corporate Governance Statement of the Company Annual 
Report, namely 2010 and 2011. We show that firms gradually tend to develop their own Codes, which contain fewer 
obligations as compared to the SEV Code, probably in an attempt to decrease the required level of transparency or 
for practical reasons. Small firms for example would incur extra costs had they had to comply with all SEV Code’s 
directives. Some however opt for the SEV Code, while including in the Corporate Governance Statement any 
deviations from its suggested practices. 
In the second year of the enforcement of the Law that requires analytic information on firms’ corporate 
governance practices, our survey finds that in some aspects companies do not deviate significantly from the 
minimum required practices, even though they seem to have comprehended to a greater extent the Code’s intentions 
and goals. Non - executive members in Boards are one in two whereas the required ratio by the Law is one in three. 
Independent members on the other hand are on average no more than two, which represents the minimum 
requirement. Firms tend not to release a lot of information on frequency of Board Meetings, on the remuneration 
packages of members of Boards and top management officials or on Internal Audit organization and practices. They 
operate Audit Committees as obliged by the Law for the last ten years, but still only one in two operate other 
specialized Committees like Remuneration and Nomination Committees even though the Code’s requirements and 
suggested best practices worldwide indicate that all the above mentioned Bodies should collectively operate. We 
stress the fact though that the difference in the degree of compliance with internationally expected standards for 
corporate governance is huge when comparing small and mid capitalization firms relative to large capitalization 
firms with the latter as expected showing more tenacity in the operation of corporate governance practices. This 
could be attributed to the fact that investment funds, that traditionally appreciate high standards of corporate 
governance in firms, are primarily directing their funds to large capitalization firms in the Greek market given also 
the deepening financial crisis.   
Nonetheless, Greek firms appear to represent a hybrid corporate governance model. It resembles the Anglo-Saxon 
model (e.g. separation of Chairman of Board and CEO, Audit Committees), but has characteristics of the traditional 
European-Continental model (e.g. family members running firms and participating on Boards). Greek firms have a 
surprisingly low degree of CEO-Chairman of Board duality. Women have a place in companies’ Boards, while the 
average size of Boards is 8 members, which is above the threshold set for ideal practices. All these underline the fact 
that Greek firms gradually incorporate corporate governance best practices in their operations. The existing 
legislation satisfactorily follows trends worldwide and further changes are about to be introduced following EU 
directives. Future research on the Greek market should attempt to estimate the degree to which corporate governance 
practices affect performance measures today, while try to relate results with the international experience. 
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